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In three studies, we explored the retention and transfer of tool-making knowledge, learnt
from an adult demonstration, to other temporal and task contexts. All studies used a
variation of a task in which children had to make a hook tool to retrieve a bucket from a
tall transparent tube. Children who failed to innovate the hook tool independently saw a
demonstration. In Study 1, we tested children aged 4–6 years (N = 53) who had seen the
original demonstration 3 months earlier. Performance was excellent at the second time,
indicating that children’s knowledge was retained over the 3 month period. In Studies 2
and 3 we explored transfer of the new knowledge to other tasks. In Study 2, children
were given two variants of the apparatus that differed in surface characteristics (e.g.,
shape and color). Participants generalized their knowledge to these new apparatuses
even though the new pipecleaner also differed in size and color. Five- to 6-year-olds
(N = 22) almost always transferred their knowledge to problems where the same tool
had to be made. Younger, 3- to 5-year-olds’ (N = 46), performance was more variable.
In Study 3, 4- to 7-year-olds (N = 146) saw a demonstration of hook making with a
pipecleaner, but then had to make a tool by combining pieces of wooden dowel (or vice
versa: original training on dowel, transfer to pipecleaner). Children did not transfer their
tool-making knowledge to the new material. Children retained tool-making knowledge
over time and transferred their knowledge to new situations in which they needed to
make a similar tool from similar materials, but not different materials. We concluded that
children’s ability to use tool-making knowledge in novel situations is likely to depend on
memory and analogical reasoning, with the latter continuing to develop during middle
childhood.
Keywords: tool use, innovation, problem solving, cognitive development, pedagogy, social learning, analogy
INTRODUCTION
The tools that facilitate human society differ in two ways from the
majority of non-human animal tools. First, the number of differ-
ent tools that we use far surpasses the number used by any other
non-human species. Second, almost all of the tools that humans
use are made not found. Although some non-human species make
tools, including some corvids such as New Caledonian crows
(Hunt and Gray, 2004) and rooks (Bird and Emery, 2009), and
chimpanzees (Boesch and Boesch, 1990), this is relatively unusual
(Shumaker et al., 2011).
Despite being experts when learning how to use tools from
others (e.g., Hopper et al., 2010), recent studies have shown a
remarkable limit to children’s ability tomake tools. Children under
8 years are very unlikely to bend a piece of wire in to a hook sponta-
neously to retrieve a reward-holding bucket from a tall transparent
tube. This is true of samples of children fromWestern, technology-
rich communities in the UK (Beck et al., 2011) and children from
the Bushman communities who, compared to Western children,
have“a lack of reliance on direct instruction in learning and greater
exposure toneeding tomake artifacts that are playedwith”(Nielsen
et al., 2014, p. 386).
Children’s tool making has been investigated using a paradigm
adapted from the non-human animal literature. A bucket baited
with a reward [food for corvid participants (Weir et al., 2002),
stickers for human children (Beck et al., 2011)] was placed at the
bottom of a tall transparent tube. The participant had a straight
piece of wire (a pipecleaner for children) that s/he needed to bend
into a hook in order to retrieve the bucket and claim the reward.
Making a hook tool independently (termed tool innovation) was
extremely difﬁcult: very few 3- to 5-year-olds succeeded, increas-
ing to only around 50% of children by the age of 7. Children
who failed to retrieve the bucket progressed to a second phase
where the experimenter demonstrated how to make a tool using
an identical pipecleaner. The pattern of performance reversed.
Almost all children, even those as young as 3 years old, followed
the experimenter’s demonstration to make their own hook, which,
they then immediately used appropriately to retrieve the bucket
(Beck et al., 2011). Success after the demonstration was termed
tool manufacture.
This dissociation in performance between the two forms of tool
making (creating novel tools and beneﬁtting from shared infor-
mation) has been replicated in several further studies. Children’s
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difﬁculties making novel tools persist when they have the chance
to use the materials before encountering the tool-making prob-
lem (Beck et al., 2011). They are also seen on different tasks. For
example, Cutting et al. (2011) presented children with a problem
where they had to unbend a folded pipecleaner to make a long
straight tool to push a ball from a tube. Children’s tool innovation
was not promoted by explicit instructions to “make something”
(Cutting et al., 2011) nor suggestions to try a different strategy
(Chappell et al., 2013). Yet in all these studies children found it easy
to make a tool given a demonstration and (almost always without
instruction) used the new tool to solve the task. We can say with
some conﬁdence that tool innovation is difﬁcult for young chil-
dren, whereas learning from others how to make new tools (tool
manufacture) is easy.
Humans are particularly well adapted for social sharing of
information especially via pedagogy (see Csibra and Gergely,
2009). We know that young children are experts at learning from
others how to use tools1 (e.g., Hopper et al., 2010). Our goal in
this paper is to extend this ﬁnding to tool making. Tool-making
knowledge is particularly important to share because it provides
novel technology to solve problems.
On a community scale this sharing is important because as
long as one has good processes for sharing information, the work
of just a few innovators (or even lucky accidents and slow col-
laborations) can be preserved. However, for this sharing to be
effective, the recipients need to do more than imitate others’ tool
making in the moment. The knowledge acquired from observa-
tions about how to make a tool needs to be robust enough to
generalize out of the immediate context. Tool-making knowl-
edge would be most useful if it were preserved over long periods
of time and could be applied to new instantiations of similar
problems. Indeed, even with many innovators and a strong ten-
dency to learn from others, if the knowledge acquired is not
robust, then the spread of novel tool making will be severely
restricted.
Thinking ﬁrst about the robustness of children’s knowledge
over time, there already exists a body of work on very young
children’s memory for information, especially actions, that they
learn from others. Meltzoff (1985) demonstrated that infants at
14 months could sometimes reproduce behavior (turning on a
light with the head) after 24 h, terming this deferred imitation.
Herbert et al. (2006) showed that even younger children, 9-month-
olds (but not 6-month-olds), could remember to press a button
on a toy 24 h after they had seen a demonstration. As children
get older they are able to retain information about actions and
objects over a longer period of time: Herbert and Hayne (2000a)
demonstrated a three step process to 24-month-olds who repro-
duced an average of 2 of the three steps 8 weeks later. Relevant
for our interest in tool making, this study also involved construc-
tion of an object as children put together three components to
make a rattle. Bauer’s (2002) work (see for review) gives further
evidence that children under two can recall multi-step sequences
over long periods of time, with 20-month-olds remembering the
order of some sequences up to 12 months after exposure (Bauer
et al., 2000).
1c.f. make tools.
Looking speciﬁcally at children using tools to solve prob-
lems, their memory for actions is impressive: Óturai et al. (2012)
showed that 18-month-olds could reproduce the most functional
aspects of how to use a tool 2 weeks after the original obser-
vation. Simpson and Riggs (2011) showed that 3-year-olds not
only remembered how to use a tool to open a puzzle box after
a week, but were selective in the information they reproduced.
When given the chance to solve the puzzle immediately after a
demonstration, 3-year-olds reproduced both functionally relevant
and irrelevant actions. After a week, irrelevant actions had largely
disappeared.
For knowledge learnt from others to be potentially useful in
spreading innovation it needs to be robust across new instan-
tiations of similar problems. Some authors have looked to see
whether changes in the context affect children’s reproduction of
behavior. Patel et al. (2013) tested children in their ﬁrst year of
life using a very simple action – removing a mitten from a puppet
and shaking it to sound a bell. They found that 6-month-olds
consistently reproduced the action 24 h later only if tested in
the same context (the same room with the same music playing).
By 12 months of age children could generalize the behavior to
new contexts where both of these elements were changed. Her-
bert and Hayne (2000b) examined how changes to the objects
involved in the actions might inﬂuence children’s retrieval. Using
the same rattle-making task as Herbert and Hayne (2000a), 30-
month-olds saw an experimenter construct a rattle using three
items on day 1 but were presented with rather different objects
(e.g., a transparent cup instead of an opaque red ball) after 24 h.
Thirty-month-olds were able to construct a rattle using the new
stimuli set.
Clearly there is evidence that very young children are able to
reproduce information taught to them by others, generalizing this
across time and across new instantiations of similar problems.
Our interest in this paper was to extend this to tool-making in
a problem-solving context. Tool making is a new domain for
research in children’s tool use and has already revealed the sur-
prising ﬁnding that tool innovation is exceptionally difﬁcult for
young children. As well as wanting to know more about chil-
dren’s developing competence in this domain, the general topic
is itself important to understand because the generalization of
innovations about how to make tools is so important for our
tool-rich culture. Are even very young children able to deploy
tool-making knowledge in a way that would support the spread of
innovations?
In three studies we explored the robustness of tool-making
knowledge gained by children fromothers. Each study focussed on
one aspect of robust generalization: retention over time (Study 1)
and transfer across problems (Studies 2 and 3). In these, the ﬁrst
studies of children’s learnt knowledge of tool-making, we aimed
to expand our understanding of children’s tool making, to explore
in principle whether their knowledge is sufﬁciently robust that it
could transmit innovation through a culture and to illustrate new
topics for further research in this ﬁeld.
STUDY 1
We investigated the ﬁrst way in which tool-making learning might
be robust: do children retain knowledge over time about how to
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make a simple tool that has been demonstrated to them. Our
study was opportunistic. We had the chance to return to a school
where we had previously tested 4- to 6-year-olds after a period
of 3 months. In the original testing session at Time 1 (T1), chil-
dren were presented with the transparent tube task with a straight
pipecleaner and given a minute to retrieve the bucket (the orig-
inal T1 data are reported in Cutting et al., 2014). In line with
previous ﬁndings, innovation performance was poor, but most
children succeeded after the experimenter demonstrated how to
make (but not use) a hook. At Time 2 (T2) 3 months later, we gave
children the possibility of demonstrating retention, i.e., the same
experimenter re-presented children with the same apparatus. Our
question was whether children would solve the task at T2 at higher
levels of success than at T1.
In the original study, we had explored how the adult demon-
stration aided children in learning how to make a tool by using
a two-stage demonstration. Children who failed to innovate their
own tool were ﬁrst shown simply a pre-made hook (made from an
identical pipecleaner), but not how to make it. If, after a further
30 s, children were still unsuccessful, the experimenter demon-
strated how to make the tool: bending an identical pipecleaner
into an appropriately sized hook in full view of the child. Would
the robustness of children’s knowledge of how to make a sim-
ple tool, demonstrated at Time 2, be inﬂuenced by how they
learnt the technique at Time 1? One possibility is that children
who were shown an end-state demonstration but ﬁgured out the
means to make the tool themselves may have better knowledge.
On the other hand, if children needed the bending demonstra-
tion to succeed, then they would have had more exposure to
hooks and hook making at T1, which may lead to more resilient
memories. A third possibility was that children’s memories are
relatively insensitive to how knowledge about tool making is
gained.
METHOD
Participants
Fifty-eight children (29 girls) participated in the original study.
Four of them did not participate at T2 (n.b. performance at T1
by these children was distributed across the different categories:
1 solved the task after the endstate demonstration, 1 after the
bending demonstration, 2 failed to solve the task). The children
who participated at T2 were 28 younger children (16 girls) aged
52–64 months, mean 57 months, and 25 older children (11 girls)
aged 65–76 months, mean 71 months. Age groups were based
on school class. Children were recruited from and tested at a
school serving a predominantly working class white population in
the UK.
Materials
We used a tall transparent tube (22 cm tall with a 4 cm opening)
attached to a board (35 cm × 21 cm, to prevent it being turned
over), a straight white pipecleaner (29 cm), and a piece of black
string (29 cm). As in previous studies, the string was included as a
distractor and was not needed to solve the task. A small bucket was
placed in the bottomof the tube containing a sticker (see Figure 1).
Where a demonstration was necessary, the experimenter used a
second identical pipecleaner.
FIGURE 1 | Apparatus and materials used in the three studies.
Procedure
The procedures for the studies reported in this paper were
approved by the University of Birmingham, UK, STEM Ethical
Review Committee.
At both times children were tested in a quiet area away out-
side the classroom by a female experimenter (NC). They were
shown the apparatus, pre-baited with the sticker and told, “If
you can get the sticker out of here you can keep it.” They were
given one minute to solve the task with the experimenter giv-
ing only neutral prompts if necessary, e.g., ‘you can try these
things.’ If after one minute children failed to retrieve the bucket,
the experimenter instructed them to stop and put down the mate-
rials. She then said ‘look at this’ and showed the child a hook
made from an identical pipecleaner (target-tool demonstration).
Children did not see the hook being made. Following this demon-
stration, children had a further 30 s to try to solve the task. If
they had still not retrieved the bucket, the experimenter asked
them to stop and put down the materials and then said ‘watch
this.’ She demonstrated bending an identical straight pipecleaner
into a hook (tool-creation demonstration). Children had a ﬁnal
minute to solve the task, with any who failed after this third phase
being assisted by the experimenter. Children participated in the
same procedure at T1 and T2 (3 months after T1). N.b. at T1
www.frontiersin.org December 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 1395 | 3
Beck et al. Is tool-making knowledge robust?
children were allocated to one of two conditions. One condition
saw a warm-up phase where the materials were manipulated by
the experimenter and the child. As this made no difference to
tool-making success at T1 or T2, we do not consider this any
further.
Analysis strategy
In the studies reported here we used the following non-parametric
statistical analyses. When comparing between groups of chil-
dren we used Pearson’s Chi Square test (with a continuity
correction) where possible and Fisher’s Exact Test when the
expected values were too small. When comparing performance
of the same individuals on two measures we used McNemar
tests. When exploring the relation between individuals’ perfor-
mance on two measures we used Chi Square or Fisher’s Exact
Tests. In this case we cross tabulated performance on the ﬁrst
measure (rows) against performance on the second measure
(columns) allowing us to look for contingency between the two
performances.
Because our analyses involvedmultiple comparisons of ourdata
we made Bonferroni corrections based on the maximum number
of planned post hoc comparisons in the main experimental design
(i.e., we considered the most comparisons we would need to test
our hypotheses, but we did not include every logically possible
test – e.g., comparing age group 1 on trial A with age group 2 on
trial B). We reported p values of <0.05 as trends.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In Study 1, we identiﬁed four planned post hoc comparisons
[Success at each time compared between age groups (2) and
comparison between T1 and T2 for each age (2)]. We report
p-values<0.013 as signiﬁcant.
Gender had no effect on children’s success (lowest p > 0.999)
and so data from boys and girls were combined.
In Cutting et al. (2014) we reported children’s poor perfor-
mance innovating a hook tool before any demonstration. We
reproduce those data here for comparison purposes, see Table 1.
Overall, it is clear that children were far more successful at mak-
ing a hook tool before seeing a demonstrate on at T2 than T1:
none of the younger children succeeded at T1, compared to 71%
at T2; 16% of the older children made a hook without an adult
demonstration at T1, 68% did so at T2. A McNemar test con-
ﬁrmed this difference in the older group: 14 children who failed at
T1 succeeded at T2 and only one child showed the reverse pattern,
p < 0.001. As no child succeeded at T1 in the younger group, we
did not compute a statistical test.
There was no difference between the younger and older chil-
dren’s performance at Time 1 (p = 0.112) or Time 2 (p = 0.585).
We considered whether learning experience at T1 inﬂuenced
performance at T2. Of the four children who passed without
a demonstration at T1, three repeated this success at T2. Using
Fishers’ Exact tests we made statistical comparisons between the
larger groups of children who saw just the endstate demonstration
Table 1 | Success on hook making task atT1 andT2, Study 1.
Time 1 Time 2 % of children participating
at this stage inT1 who
succeeded (cumulative %
of children passing by this
stage)
Pre-demonstration
(innovation)
Target-tool
demo
Tool-creation
demo
Never
succeeded
Younger children
(4–5 years)
Pre-demonstration
(innovation)
– – – – 0% (0%)
Target-tool demo 8 1 – – 32% (32%)
Tool-creation demo 6 3 1 – 53% (68%)
Never succeeded 6 1 2 –
Older children
(5–6 years)
Pre-demonstration
(innovation)
3 1 – – 16% (16%)
Target-tool demo 7 2 – – 43% (52%)
Tool-creation demo 4 2 – – 50% (76%)
Never succeeded 3 3 – –
% of children
participating at
this stage in T2
who succeeded
(cumulative % of
children passing
by this stage)
Younger 71% (71%) 63% (89%) 100% (100%)
Older 68% (68%) 100% (100%) –
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and those who saw the endstate plus the bending demonstrations.
Therewasnodifference in likelihoodof pre-demonstration success
at T2 based on the demonstrations seen at T1: younger children
N = 19, p = 0.303, older children N = 15, p < 0.999.
Our opportunistic study prevents us making a causal claim
about the effect of seeing a demonstration at T1 on success at T2,
as we did not have a control group of children at T2 who were not
exposed to a demonstration at T1. However, the evidence strongly
points to the conclusion that children who have learnt how to
make a simple tool following a demonstration retain this knowl-
edge for a substantial period of time (at least 3 months). Despite
being 3 months older than they were at T1, naïve children at the
age tested in T2 would be expected to struggle to solve the task
without a demonstration. In a previous study, 7% of 4- to 5-year-
olds and 36% of 5- to 6-year-olds succeeded spontaneously (Beck
et al., 2011), compared to 71 and 68% in this study. Furthermore,
within this study the younger children at T2 are still substantially
younger than the older children at T1; the latter performed rela-
tively poorly pre-demonstration (16% success) while 71% of the
younger sample at T2 made a hook.
Our evidence suggests that when children learn how to make a
tool by watching another this knowledge is robust, in at least one
sense: most children retain this knowledge and are able to draw on
it after a relatively long period of time.
STUDY 2
In Study 2, we began our investigation of whether tool-making
knowledge would transfer out of the immediate context. New
instantiations of problems that require the same solution are likely
to differ in surface characteristics. However, this cannot confuse
the novice tool maker. She needs to recognize when a tool she
already has in her repertoire could be useful.
There are two ways in which the knowledge gained from the
tool-making demonstrationmight transfer to other contexts. First,
childrenmay learn something general about thepossibility of mak-
ing tools. They may be ‘primed’ for innovation. In this case, we
would expect children to succeed when given tasks that required
making simple tools other than hooks. In fact, we already know
that this is not the case. In Cutting et al.’s (2011) study, chil-
dren were sequentially presented with two different problems: the
hook-making vertical tube task and a horizontal tube task where
a bent pipecleaner had to be straightened to make a long tool to
push a ball from the tube. Tasks were counterbalanced and there
was no effect on success on the second task, having been shown
how to make a tool to solve the ﬁrst task. Making a tool follow-
ing a demonstration did not lead to a general tendency for tool
innovation. In Studies 2 and 3, having shown children a demon-
stration of how to make a tool (if needed), we then presented
them with a similar problem that differed in surface characteris-
tics. In Study 2 we varied the color, size and shape of the tube, and
the color and size of the tool-making materials (pipecleaner and
string).
METHOD
Participants
Sixty-nine children participated in this study. One further 4-year-
old child chose towithdrawmidway through the study andhis data
are not presented here. Based on school class children were treated
as a 3- to 4-year-old group, N = 20, 10 girls, mean age 46 months,
range 40–53; a 4- to 5-year-old group, N = 26, 12 girls, mean
age 61, range 55–66; and a 5- to 6-year-old group, N = 23, 11
girls, mean age 72, range 67–77. Children were recruited from and
tested at a school serving a predominantly working-class black
population in the UK.
Materials
We used the original tube (22 cm tall with 4 cm opening) with a
cream colored 29 cm pipecleaner, a 29 cm length of purple string,
a round green bucket, and cartoon character stickers. In the new
versions of the task we used (1) a shorter green tube (17 cm tall
with a 4.5 cm opening), red metallic 29 cm pipecleaner, a length
of black string, a round blue bucket with a ‘hoop’ handle, and
ladybug stickers and (2) a cuboid clear transparent box (20 cm
square with a 4 cm opening), a 29cm purple pipecleaner, a length
of silver colored string, a square yellow bucket and star stickers
(see Figure 1).
Procedure
Children were tested in a quiet area away from the rest of the class
by a female experimenter (ZD). There were three different ver-
sions of the task, each with distinct apparatus and tool-making
materials. For each task, children were presented with the pre-
baited apparatus and told ‘If you can get the sticker out of
here you can keep it.’ Children were given 1 min to attempt to
retrieve the bucket. If they did so, they were given the sticker
and progressed to the next version of the task. If they did not
retrieve the bucket independently, the experimenter asked them
to stop and put down their materials and watch her. She took
an identical pipecleaner to the one available on that task and
demonstrated how to bend it in to a hook (tool-creation demon-
stration). Children were then given 30 s to try to retrieve the
sticker. Unlike Study 1, we used a single stage demonstration to
simplify analysis and to reduce the length of time taken by the
study. Each child participated in all three versions of the task:
the order was counterbalanced between children. After the ﬁrst
and second versions of the task the apparatus was cleared away
before the new task was produced. After the third version, the
child was thanked and returned to the classroom with his/her
stickers.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In Study 2, we identiﬁed 18 planned post hoc comparisons [com-
parison of each age group’s performance on pairs of trials (9),
comparison between pairs of age groups on each trial (9)]. We
report p-values<0.003 as signiﬁcant in our post hoc analyses.
Gender had no effect on children’s success (lowest p = 0.407)
and so data from boys and girls were combined.
We coded whether children bent the pipecleaner into a hook
and used it successfully to retrieve the bucket from the tube
before the demonstration for that trial. These results are shown in
Figure 2. Including all children, regardless of age group,McNemar
tests showed that performance was better on trial 2 compared to
trial 1 (30 passed trial 2 only, none passed trial 1 only, p < 0.001)
and better on trial 3 compared to trial 1 (40 passed trial 3 only, 1
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passed trial 1 only, p< 0.001). There was no signiﬁcant difference
between trials 2 and 3 (p = 0.093).
We explored these patterns for each age group separately. For
the oldest 5- to 6-year-olds performance on trial 2 was better than
trial 1 (17 passed only the second compared to 0 who passed
only the ﬁrst, p < 0.001) and performance on trial 3 was bet-
ter than trial 1 (19 passed only trial 3 compared to 0, p < 0.001).
There was no improvement between trials 2 and 3 (two children
passed only trial 2 and 4 passed only trial 3, p = 0.687). For the
4- to 5-year-olds we were not able to run statistical tests involv-
ing the ﬁrst trial as the data were uniform: no child passed the
ﬁrst but not the second trial and eight showed the reverse and
no child passed the ﬁrst trial but not the third and 12 showed
the reverse. There was no signiﬁcant improvement between the
second and third trials p = 0.070 (one child passed only trial 2
and 7 children passed only trial 3). For the youngest children
(3- to 4-year-olds) there were no signiﬁcant differences between
trials. (lowest p = 0.063). However, the pattern of performance
shown in Figure 2 for both 3- to 4- and 4- to 5-year-olds makes
us reticent to assert positively that there is no improvement in
performance.
We made comparisons between the age groups on the different
trials. On trial 1 only 3 of 69 children succeeded, so it was not
possible to conduct a statistical test. However, on trials 2 and 3
Chi Square Tests revealed that performance differed by age group,
trial 2 χ2 (df = 2, N = 69) = 12.89, p = 0.002 and trial 3 χ2
(df = 2, N = 69) = 10.77, p = 0.005. Post hoc Chi Square tests
comparing between age groups showed trends to signiﬁcance that
the 5- to 6-year-olds performance better than both younger age
groups on the later trials (p-values ranged from 0.002 to 0.028),
whereas performance by the younger two age groups did not differ
(lowest p = 0.526).
However, these data are relatively conservative as they include
all children in the comparisons, even some who did not see a
hook-making demonstration before progressing to the next trial.
One unanticipated problem was that some children managed to
retrieve the bucket from the tube using a straight pipecleaner using
a dragging or levering technique. This was a particular problem
with the new green tube apparatus, which had short straight sides.
Eight children did this with the green apparatus, four with the
FIGURE 2 | Performance on each trial before demonstration in Study 2.
clear tube, and four with the box apparatus. Although these chil-
dren were not counted as successfully making a hook, they did
not then see a hook-making demonstration, but progressed to the
second and third trials. Furthermore, on the second and third
trials some children bent the pipecleaner into a hook shape, but
then did not successfully retrieve the bucket. Perhaps it is not
surprising that having seen a demonstration of bending for the
ﬁrst apparatus some children went on to make a hook, which
did not have appropriate dimensions for the novel apparatus
they were then presented with. Indeed, by changing the sur-
face features of the tasks, we may also have inadvertently made
the task more challenging in terms of technical skill. To make a
less conservative estimate of children’s transfer to similar tasks,
we excluded the children who solved the task without making
a tool in trial 1. We also excluded data from four children who
made a non-functional hook in trial 2 but did not then receive
a demonstration of appropriate hook-bending. Thus, all chil-
dren in the reduced sample (N = 54) had either solved the task
by making a functional hook or seen a demonstration from the
experimenter on failing trial 1 or 2. Using this reduced sample
the pattern of results did not change from the previous analysis,
apart from the comparison between the older two age groups on
trials 2 and 3, which were no longer a trend (p = 0.053 in both
tests). Figure 3 shows the proportion of success in the reduced
sample.
We explored whether individual children’s performance on the
three trials was related. As performancewas near ﬂoor on trial 1 we
were not able to include this in our statistical analysis (n.b. three
children solved the task spontaneously on trial 1. Of these twowent
on to solve trial 2 and 3 and the third child solved trial 2 but made
an inappropriately sized hook on trial 3 that was non-functional).
We used Chi Square to look for relations between performance
on trials 2 and 3. There was a relation between these trials when
all children were included, χ2(1,69) = 7.145, p = 0.008 (reduced
sample χ2(1,54) = 7.891, p = 0.005). As children in the younger
groups reached around 50% correct on the latter two trials, we
also ran Chi Square tests excluding the oldest age group to see
if performance on these trials was related. This was not the case,
FIGURE 3 | Performance on each trial before demonstration in Study 2,
reduced sample of children who had made a hook or seen a
demonstration of hook making.
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χ2(1,46) = 2.145, p = 0.143 (reduced sample, χ2(1,33) = 2.284,
p = 0.131.
Overall, we draw two conclusions from this study. Children at
all ages showed some ability to transfer knowledge to novel instan-
tiations of a similar problem with different surface characteristics.
This effect was strongest in 5- to 6-year-olds who went from near
ﬂoor performance to near ceiling (from5 to 86% success). Younger
children’s (3- to 5-year-olds) transfer was less convincing. Their
near ﬂoor performance increased to around 50% success, although
was not shown to be a signiﬁcant difference.
STUDY 3
Study 2 demonstrated that children show some ability to trans-
fer knowledge they gain from one problem to another similar
problem which differs only on surface characteristics. In Study
3 we further explored children’s ability to transfer knowledge
from one problem to another. Children were presented twice
with the same tube apparatus. Each attempt at the task required
them to make a hook tool, but we altered the means and
materials by which they could make one. On one presenta-
tion children were required to bend a pipecleaner into a hook
as per the previous studies. On the other presentation chil-
dren were required to make a hook tool by adding pieces of
dowel together to make a wooden hook (see Cutting, unpub-
lished). This study was designed to investigate whether knowledge
of making a hook tool would transfer to new materials and
methods of tool making. We know that children do not trans-
fer general tool-making knowledge when they need to make
two different tools (Cutting et al., 2011), but can they general-
ize knowledge of a speciﬁc tool, a hook, to a new tool-making
problem?
METHOD
Participants
One hundred and forty six children participated in this study.
Based on school class children represented a 4- to 5-year-old group,
N = 65, 33 girls, mean age 56 months, range 51–62; a 5- to 6-year-
old group, N = 26, 14 girls, mean age 69, range 63–74; and a 6- to
7-year-old group, N = 55, 33 girls, mean age 79, range 75–86. As
there were far fewer children in the 5- to 6-year-old class we used
a median split to divide children in to a younger group, N = 73,
39 girls, mean age 57, range 51–65, and an older group, N = 73,
41 girls, mean age 78, range 66–86. Children were recruited from
and tested at a school serving a predominantly working-class white
population in the UK.
Materials
We used the original tube (22 cm tall with 4 cm opening) with
a round green bucket, and cartoon character stickers. On the
pipecleaner version of the task children were presented with a
29 cm white pipecleaner and a 29 cm piece of black string. In the
dowel version of the task children were presented with a 28 cm
long piece of dowel (diameter = 1.5 cm, the dowel had three
holes drilled in to it, one in the middle and one 1 cm from
each end, diameter of holes = 0.5 cm), and two shorter pieces
of dowel (1 × length 10 cm, diameter = 0.5 cm; 1 × length 4 cm,
diameter = 0.5 cm, see Figure 1).
Procedure
Children were tested in a quiet area away from the rest of the class
by a female experimenter (SR). Childrenwere presented twicewith
the same tube apparatus. On the ﬁrst trial children were given
either the pipecleaner and string materials or the dowel materials.
They received the other set of materials for their second trial.
Order of materials was counterbalanced across participants. For
each trial, children were presented with the pre-baited apparatus
and told ‘If you can get the sticker out of here you can keep it.’
Children were given one minute to attempt to retrieve the bucket.
If they did so, they were given the sticker and progressed to the
next trial. If they did not retrieve the bucket independently, the
experimenter asked them to stop and put down their materials
and watch her. In the pipecleaner version of the task she took
an identical pipecleaner to the one available and demonstrated
how to bend it into a hook. On the dowel version of the task
she took an identical piece of large dowel with holes drilled in
and demonstrated how to insert the 4 cm piece of dowel into one
of the holes at the end of the long dowel. Children were then
given 30 s to try to retrieve the sticker. As in Study 2, we used
a single stage demonstration to simplify analysis and to reduce
the length of time taken by the study. After the ﬁrst trial, the
apparatus was cleared away and reset before being re-presented to
the participant with new materials. After the second version of the
task, the child was thanked and returned to the classroom with
his/her stickers.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In Study 3, we identiﬁed eight planned post hoc comparisons
[Comparison of performance on the dowel and pipecleaner ver-
sions of the task separately for each age group (2), comparison
between age groups’ performance on dowel and on pipecleaner
tasks (2), comparison of dowel task presented ﬁrst or second for
each age group (2), and comparison of pipecleaner task presented
ﬁrst or second for each age group (2)]. We report p-values<0.006
as signiﬁcant in our post hoc analyses.
Gender had no effect on children’s success (lowest p = 0.157)
and so data from boys and girls were combined.
For the hook-making task children were coded as successful
if they bent the pipecleaner into a hook and used it to retrieve
the bucket within the one minute time-frame. Overall, children
were poor at this task with only 20/146 succeeding at making
a pipecleaner hook. Absolute success levels were relatively low
on the dowel task with only 33/146 children successfully adding
pieces of dowel together to make a hook tool. The dowel task was
signiﬁcantly easier than the pipecleaner task when we compared
all age groups,McNemar, p= 0.041 (24 children passed only dowel
and 11 passed only pipecleaner), but did not reach signiﬁcance for
either the older (p = 0.78) or younger (p = 0.424) age groups.
There was a trend for performance on the dowel task to improve
with age, χ2(df = 1, N = 146) = 5.638, p = 0.018, but this
comparison did not reach signiﬁcance for the pipecleaner task
p = 0.092.
To explore whether children transferred their knowledge bew-
teen tasks we testedwhether attempting a task after having seen the
solution to the other task improved performance. Whether chil-
dren had the hooks task ﬁrst or second made no difference to their
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level of success, all children, χ2(1, N = 146) = 1.612, p = 0.204
(younger children p > 0.999, older p = 0.123). It made no dif-
ference to success levels whether children received the dowel task
ﬁrst or second, all children, χ2(1, N = 146) = 0.094, p = 0.759,
(younger children p = 0.515, older p = 0.353).
We used a Fishers’ Exact Test to look for a relation between
performance on the dowel and pipecleaner versions of the task.
This was signiﬁcant, p = 0.018, suggesting that the likelohood of
success on the two tool-making tasks were related. However, this
was largely driven by the 102 (of 146) children who failed both
versions of the task (nine passed both, 24 passed only dowel, 11
passed only pipecleaner).
These results show that children did not transfer knowledge
they gained from their ﬁrst attempt at the task onto their second
attempt. Bending a pipecleaner into a hook for oneself, or being
shown how to make a hook to retrieve the bucket did not aid
chidren in making a hook by adding piecing of dowel together.
Similarly children who made a hook, either independently or
after demonstration, by adding pieces of dowel together were not
more successful at making the same tool by bending a straight
pipecleaner.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In three studies, we sought to explore the possibility that chil-
dren’s observation of othersmaking toolsmay produce sufﬁciently
robust knowledge that could be deployed after a period of time
and in response to novel but similar problems. We studied young
children because of recent results suggesting that tool making (as
compared to tool use or non-tool action sequences) might pose
particular problems for young children (Beck et al., 2011) and
to see if even very young children gained robust tool-making
knowledge from adult demonstrations. Broadly, we argued that
to support the diversity of tools in our tool-rich culture the
tool-making knowledge gained from others needs these robust
qualities.
Our evidence showed that tool-making knowledge gained by
observation was robust when knowledge needed to be applied
to the same problem at a later time point. In Study 1, children
were dramatically better at making a hook at Time 2 com-
pared to Time 1. Four- to 6-year-olds were able to retain the
knowledge they gained when, having failed to solve the task at
Time 1, they saw a demonstration of how to make an appropri-
ate tool. They reproduced the tool making they had previously
seen.
In Studies 2 and 3, we turned to a different way in which tool-
making knowledge could be robust: do children transfer their
tool-making knowledge to new situations? In study 2, children
encountered novel problems that required similar solutions, but
differed in surface characteristics. Five- to 6-year-olds performed
near ceiling on later trials. Younger 3- to 5-year-olds did this
to some extent, succeeding on about 50% of subsequent trials,
although the difference between trials was not always statisti-
cally signiﬁcant. Future research should disambiguate this ﬁnding.
However, in Study 3, we investigated whether children could use
their knowledge of the tool required to make the same tool from
a different material. Children aged 5–7 failed to transfer their tool
knowledge to new materials.
In some ways our ﬁndings are unsurprising given the litera-
ture that shows that even children in the ﬁrst 2 years of life can
reproduce actions after time delays and in novel contexts. This was
important to show in the context of toolmaking because it suggests
that when children copy the adults’ tool-making demonstration
they are learning something about the type of tool they aremaking,
not simply copying blindly and responding the adults’ immediate
actions. However, despite being able to retain tool-making knowl-
edge over an extended period of time, children experienced some
problems transferring this knowledge to related but different sit-
uations (3- to 5-year-olds in Study 2 and 4- to 7-year-olds in
Study 3).
Most strikingly, even when the problem to be solved remained
identical (Study 3), children did not recognize the similarity
between the solutions which involved different materials and
transformations (pipecleaners or dowel, Study 3). Children may
have struggled to notice the similar causal structure shared
between the different instantiations of the task (of the appara-
tus or tool-making materials). Based on the partial success by the
younger children and convincing success by the older children in
Study 2, it seems that children ﬁnd it easier to transfer knowledge
to new instantiations of the task, which share the same materials
and transformation for tool making, than to transfer the abstract
knowledge of the particular type of tool that is needed. It is partic-
ularly interesting that children were limited in transferring their
knowledge to new tool-making materials (i.e., between dowel and
pipecleaners). The exact material from which a tool is made is not
critical to the solution, although, of course, the material needs to
be suitable for the task in hand. This suggests an interesting limit
on children’s ability to make tools to solve problems.
One possibility is thatwhile the ability to copy and retain copied
behavior is relatively early developing, transferring this knowledge
to other situations relies on analogical reasoning that is later devel-
oping. While young children can attend to some relations between
items from a relatively young age, it appears that changes occur
in their success at drawing analogies at around 5 years of age.
Rattermann and Gentner (1998) claim that this is a qualitative
change: a relational shift, by which children stop focussing exclu-
sively on surface perceptual similarity and instead move to make
judgments based on relational similarity between items. Thus, is
it possible that in our tasks children focus on the differences in
surface features of the task and fail to notice the shared structural
similarity. A different position is held by Goswami (1991) who
argues that changes in children’s analogical reasoning come about
because of quantitative changes in their domain knowledge. Per-
haps children need to make more explicit their understanding of
pliable materials and hookable objects. Our current ﬁndings do
not speak to whether children’s analogical reasoning is developing
or whether they are gaining greater domain speciﬁc knowledge,
or indeed whether changes in the robustness of children’s tool-
making knowledge is better characterized in a different way to
advances in analogical reasoning.
It would be of interest to see if children’s performance on our
tool-making transfer task maps onto changes in their analogical
reasoning ability [which may be taken as support for Rattermann
and Gentner’s (1998) position], or whether increased exposure
to using hooks before attempting the tool-making task improves
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transfer [which would support Goswami (1991)]. Furthermore,
many analogical reasoning tasks ask children explicitly to iden-
tify a target that is the same as the original. We already know
that simply drawing children’s attention to the fact that they have
to ‘make something’ does not help them innovate (Cutting et al.,
2011). However, children may be assisted in transferring knowl-
edge about toolmaking if theywere directed to look for similarities
between instantiations of the task. Of course, if we uncovered a
need for such scaffolding, this would further underline the need
for pedagogical support in children’s developing understanding of
tools.
Learning about tool-making from others might offer further
insights in to the nature of innovation and collaboration. It is
worth considering that in our procedure children are not sim-
ply imitating the experimenter to solve the bucket/tube problem.
Rather, children learn how to make the tool by observing the other,
but they then go on to use it appropriately, despite not having seen
such a tool used to solve this problem. In this sense the solution to
the problem is reached through collaboration. Tool-making may
offer a particularly rich domain in which to explore the develop-
ment of collaboration as different members of a team can offer
diverse insights in to the overall task. It will be interesting in the
future to investigate how children collaborate to solve such prob-
lems. Similarly, one might investigate the metacognitive aspects of
problem solving using such a paradigm. For example, do children
attribute credit to the demonstrator who showed them how to
make a tool by sharing the reward, e.g., Warneken et al. (2011), or
by giving explicit credit? One reason to think that childrenmay not
explicitly recognize another’s role in problem solving comes from
the wealth of literature on children’s source monitoring, where
children up to at least 5 years often claim inaccurately that they
found something out through their own actions, when in fact this
information was provided by another (see, e.g., Robinson and
Whitcombe, 2003). It is also worth noting that in our studies,
the experimenter demonstrated to the children how to make an
appropriate tool using ostensive cues and she did so at a point in
the experiment where the child might rightly infer that she was
trying to help them. It remains to be tested whether children learn
tool-making information just as well from non-ostensive evidence
and, separately, whether information gained in thisway is as robust
over time and context as that which has been explicitly taught.
These studies suggest that even in young children knowl-
edge gained from teaching about tool-making is robust to some
extent, but the ability to transfer knowledge to novel situations
continues to develop in middle childhood. Following a single
demonstration and experience children could replicate the same
tool-making behavior after a substantial period of time. To some
extent information was generalized between problems, but we
speculate that development of analogical reasoning is critical for
children to generalize tool-making knowledge to novel situations
appropriately.
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